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Abstract
We study an economy with private and public sectors in which workers invest in imperfectly
observable skills that are important to the private sector but not to the public sector. Gov-
ernment regulation allows native majority workers to be employed in the public sector with
positive probability while excluding the minority from it. We show that even when the public
sector oﬀers the highest wage rate, it is still possible that the discriminated group is, on average,
economically more successful. The reason is that the preferential policy lowers the majority’s
incentive to invest in imperfectly observable skills by exacerbating the informational free riding
problem in the private sector labor market. We then examine the eﬀects of a dramatic policy
shift in Malaysia and show that the more intensive preferential treatment in favor of Malays in
its New Economic Policy from 1970s has increased the Chinese/Malay wage ratio. While this
evidence is consistent with our model, it is diﬃcult to be reconciled with alternative explana-
tions of ethnic wage gap based on immigration selection and exogenous cultural diﬀerences.
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Government-mandated discrimination of ethnic or religious groups is a common phenomenon
in many places around the world. The most well-known examples are probably the Jim Crow laws
in the United States and the South African apartheid system. There are also numerous instances
of such policies in other parts of the world (see Sowell 1990). For example, in many Southeast
Asian countries including Malaysia and Philippines, Chinese have continuously been the subject of
oﬃcial discrimination ranging from minor harassments, such as special taxes for signs written in
Chinese, to more signiﬁcant measures such as bans from a wide range of professions, discriminatory
taxation, and bans against Chinese-owned retail and trade (see Purcell 1965).
Surprisingly, there seems to be no uniform relationship between a group’s economic performance
and whether it is discriminated against by government-mandate. While Blacks in the United States
and South Africa have suﬀered dearly from the discriminatory policies, the overseas Chinese in
Southeast Asia is economically more successful than the preferentially treated natives. In Malaysia,
for example, the Chinese median income has been roughly twice the Malay median income during
the post-colonial era. The Jews in Europe is another group that has managed to prosper despite
economic restrictions and political persecutions, and there are many other less well-known examples.
What determines the relationship between government-mandated discrimination and the eco-
nomic performance? Are there any systematic reasons for the economic prosperity of overseas
Chinese and the Jews despite discriminatory policies? In this paper, we provide a simple model of
the incentive eﬀects of discriminatory policies and show, in a nutshell, that discriminatory policies
may serve as a useful device to alleviate an informational free riding problem among the members
of the discriminated group and enhance human capital investments. Hence, government-mandated
discrimination could actually be the reason for, rather than an obstacle to, economic success.
In Section 2 we consider an economy with two sectors, which we refer to as the private and the
public sector respectively. The crucial distinction between the sectors is that the government is
able to regulate the hiring policies in what we refer to as the public sector. Workers make a costly
investment in skills prior to entering the labor market. Skills are crucial for private sector jobs but
unimportant for the public sector.
T h eo n l yf r i c t i o ni nt h em o d e li st h a tﬁrms do not perfectly observe workers’ skill investment
decisions, instead they must rely on noisy signals to make inference about workers’ skills. This
leads to an informational free riding problem since the ﬁrms’ perception of the fraction of skilled
workers in the population is a public good (see also Fang 2001 and Norman 2003). The public
sector jobs are assumed to be attractive in the sense that their wages are higher than the highest
1equilibrium wages in the private sector.1
We model the government-mandated discriminatory policy as a government regulation that
prohibits the minorities from access to public sector jobs, while allowing the native majority workers
to be hired on these jobs with positive probability. The probability that majority workers can obtain
a public sector job is our measure of the extent of governmental control of the labor market: a
higher probability must imply that the public sector is large and vice versa.
Since we assume that the public sector jobs are most attractive, it is clear that, if all native
majority workers could be given a public sector job, then the majority would certainly do better
than the discriminated minority. The main part of our analysis is to show that when the probability
of obtaining a public sector job for the majority is suﬃciently small, the minority may, on average,
be economically more successful than the majority. The intuition is as follows. The direct eﬀect
from being excluded from the highest paying jobs is to reduce the average wage of the minority
group. However, the exclusion also creates better incentives to invest in skills valuable in the private
sector, which partially alleviates the informational free riding problem among the group members.
The latter, indirect equilibrium eﬀect, may dominate the direct eﬀect. The magnitude of the wealth
diﬀerentials that can be generated by the model can in principle be substantial.
Our model is very stylized and designed to understand the possible beneﬁts a group may enjoy
from discriminatory legislation. Naturally, this model will not provide a full explanation to why
certain discriminated groups are so much more successful than others. However, there are several
parameters in the model that are suggestive about why discriminatory policies seem to have led to
economic hardships for blacks in the pre-civil rights US and South Africa, whereas other groups, like
the Chinese in Southeast Asia, enjoyed relative economic success. The extent of the discriminatory
policies is crucial in the sense that exclusion can only be beneﬁcial if the government controlled
sector is small enough. As far as we understand, the policies facing blacks were signiﬁcantly broader
measures than those implemented in Southeast Asia. Moreover, it is necessary that some sector
where investments in skills are important is left open for the discriminated group. Again, this seems
like a more plausible assumption when considering overseas Chinese.
In Section 3 we confront the model with some empirical evidence from Malaysia, where a rather
dramatic policy shift occurred in 1970. The ethnic Chinese in Malaysia were discriminated against
prior to the implementation of the ”New Economic Policy”. However, this policy, implemented
when the Nationalistic Pan Malayan Islamic Party ousted a coalition representing the three major
1This assumption is made because it seems more realistic to us that the politically dominant group excludes
minorities from the most attractive professions. It would have been easier to obtain our results if this assumption is
not satisﬁed.
2ethnic groups (Malays, Chinese, Indians), increased the intensity of the preferential policies in favor
of the Malays. Interestingly, we ﬁnd that the Chinese/Malay wage gap was decreasing prior to the
implementation of the New Economic Policy, and started to increase again for cohorts entering the
labor market after the policy change. This is consistent with our models prediction that economic
performance may be positively related to the degree of discrimination.
It is true that the wage gap could be explained by a number of other models. The most obvious
explanation may be a selection argument, although we ﬁnd that somewhat doubtful since the
Chinese have been in Malaysia for a rather long time. Cultural factors independent of economic
conditions could presumably also be the explanation. However, neither of these stories would
explain why the ethnic wage gap is inversely related to the degree of preferential treatment for
Malays.
Being driven by a signal extraction problem, our model is most closely related to models of
statistical discrimination following Arrow (1973), Phelps (1972), and, more recently, Coate and
Loury (1993). This literature tries to understand how discrimination can arise as an equilibrium
phenomenon, which is usually rationalized in models with multiple equilibria. In contrast, dis-
crimination is by government mandate in this paper. While informational externalities similar to
those in models of statistical discrimination are crucial for our results, multiplicity of equilibria
is not central to our analysis. There is also some recent work on the relationship between ethnic
discrimination, migration and human capital investments that relates to our work. In particular,
Katz and Rapoport (2003) point out that the risk of future ethnic discrimination (resulting in more
uncertainty about future earnings) and migration possibilities tends to make the option value of
education larger for the minority than for the majority.
2T h e o r y
2.1 The Model
A. The Private and Public Sectors
Consider an economy with two sectors, called respectively the private and the public sector.
The private sector consists of two (or more) competitive ﬁrms, indexed by i = 1,2. Firms are risk
neutral and maximize expected proﬁts, and are endowed with a technology that is complementary
to workers’ skills. A skilled worker can produce β > 0 units of output, and an unskilled one will,
by normalization, produce 0.
The public sector oﬀers a ﬁxed wage g to any worker who is hired, but there is rationing of
public sector jobs: the probability of getting hired in the public sector if a worker applies is given
3by ρj ∈ [0,1], where j ∈ {A,B} i st h ew o r k e r ’ se t h n i ci d e n t i t y .I no u ra n a l y s i sb e l o w ,w et r e a tρj
as the government’s policy parameter. Government-mandated discriminatory policies are simply
modeled by the assumption that ρA 6= ρB.
We call the minority group A and let B label the majority. We say that group A is discriminated
by government mandate relative to majority group B if ρA < ρB.23 The “public sector” in our
paper is a metaphor for the part of the economy that the government can control with legislation.
That is, industries where the government can control, either through direct ownership, or through
professional licensing, should all be considered as part of our government sector. The parameter ρj
will, to some degree, represent the extent of the government’s control of the economy.
Workers who apply for but are unsuccessful in obtaining public sector employment can return
t oa n do b t a i naj o bi nt h ep r i v a t es e c t o rw i t h o u tw a i t i n g .
B. Workers
For each ethnic group j ∈ {A,B}, there is a continuum of workers with mass λj in the economy.
Workers are heterogeneous in their costs, denoted by c, of acquiring the requisite skills for the
o p e r a t i o no ft h eﬁrms’ technology. The cost c is private information of the worker. We assume that
is distributed according to a uniform [0,1] distribution in the population of both groups.4
Workers are risk neutral and do not care directly about whether they work in the public or
private sector. If a worker of cost type c receives wage w, his payoﬀ is w −c if she invests in skills,
and w if she does not invest.
C. Timing of Events and Information Structure
It is useful to divide the events in this economy into four stages that we now detail. The timing
of events is summarized in Figure 1.
In the ﬁrst stage, each worker in group j with investment cost c ∈ [0,1] decides whether to invest
in the skills. This binary decision is denoted by s ∈ {0,1} where s = 0 stands for no skill investment
and s = 1 for skill acquisition. If a worker chooses s = 1, we say that she becomes qualiﬁed and
2We treat ρ
j as exogenous in our analysis. In a more realistic setup, one can imagine that there is a limited
number of public sector vacancies and the probability of being employed in the public sector equals to the ratio of
the vacancy and the number of applicants. The main insight of this paper is robust to such a formulation. In fact, in
our leading example, every worker wants public sector employment, justifying the assumption.
3T h er e l a t i v es i z eo fg r o u pA is irrelevant in our model, so the discriminated group is referred to as the minority
only to make the language less awkward.












Figure 1: Timing of the events.
hence she can produce β units of output in the private sector; otherwise she is unqualiﬁed and will
produce 0. We write the skill acquisition proﬁle for group j as Sj :[ 0 ,1] → {0,1}.
It is important that skill acquisitions are not p e r f e c t l yo b s e r v e db yt h eﬁrms. However, in the
second stage, the worker and the ﬁrms observe a noisy signal θ ∈ {h,l} ≡ Θ about the worker’s
skill acquisition decision.5 We assume that a high signal h (and a low signal l, respectively) reveals
aq u a l i ﬁed (an unqualiﬁed, respectively) worker correctly with probability p>1/2. That is,
Pr[θ = h|s = 1]=P r[ θ = l|s =0 ]=p>1/2.
Note that the signal distributions are identical for both groups.
In the third stage, after observing the noisy signal θ, each worker decides whether to apply
for the public sector job. If applying, she is accepted for employment in the public sector with
probability ρj where j is his ethnic identity.
If she did not get employed in the public sector, she will, in the fourth stage, return to the
private sector, where ﬁrms compete for his service by posting wage oﬀers. Firm i0sw a g eo ﬀer
schedule, denoted by w
j
i : Θ → R+, c a nd e p e n do nt h ew o r k e r ’ se t h n i ci d e n t i t yj and his test signal
θ ∈ Θ. After observing the wage oﬀers, she decides which ﬁrm to work for, clearing the private
sector labor market.
D. Discussion of the Assumptions
Now we discuss some of our modelling choices.
• Output is not contractible in our model. The informational externality that is driving our
results would disappear if workers could be made residual claimants on output, so this as-
sumption is important. One way to justify this assumption is that workers are engaged in
5Models of statistical discrimination usually assume that signals are distributed according to a continuous density
fq if the worker invests in skills and fu if she does not, and that fq/fu satisﬁes the strict monotone likelihood ratio
property. We could also follow this route, but prefer the binary formulation for its simplicity.
5team production and only the aggregate, but not the individual, output can be observed by
the ﬁrm.
• The informational externality would also disappear if the workers can access the production
technology. In our model we rule this out by assuming that only the ﬁrms have access to
the technology. One way to justify such an assumption is to appeal to “entrepreneurial
ability” as necessary for successful operation of a ﬁrm and identify ﬁrms with entrepreneurs.
Alternatively, one could imagine that there is a minimum eﬃcient scale of production and the
workers are ﬁnancially constrained; or, that the operation of the technology requires some
technical know-how that only the ﬁrms have access to.
• We assume that skill investment decision is made before the public sector employment lottery
is conducted. This timing assumption is crucial for our results. Otherwise, the preferential
policy for the majority in the public sector would not adversely aﬀect their skill investment
incentives. This seems to be a reasonable assumption since employment often starts after
human capital investments are already chosen.
• We assume that if a worker is unsuccessful in obtaining public sector employment, she can
immediately return to the private sector to ﬁnd a job. Moreover, since the noisy signal is
realized before public sector jobs are allocated, workers know exactly what wage they would
get in the private sector. These assumptions are made in order not to build in any disguised
“matching costs” in the public sector. In other words, our choice of timing guarantees that
a worker has nothing to lose from applying for a public sector job if the wage is higher there
t h a nt h ew a g es h ew o u l dg e ti nt h ep r i v a t es e c t o r .
• B o t ht h ep u b l i cs e c t o rw a g eg and the probability of obtaining public sector employment ρj
are independent of θ. These extreme assumptions are made so that our main idea can be
conveyed in the simplest possible fashion. The results are robust to alternative assumptions
as long as “luck” is more important in the public sector than in the private sector.
2.2 Equilibrium
Since the two groups in the model do not interact, we will analyze the equilibrium for each group
separately. A Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (PBNE) for group j consists of a skill acquisition
proﬁle Sj (·), job application and oﬀer acceptance decisions by group j workers, together with ﬁrm
wage oﬀer schedules w
j
i (·), such that every player optimizes against other players’ strategy proﬁle
6for a consistent belief system.6
We ﬁrst analyze the equilibrium wage oﬀers in the fourth stage. A private ﬁrm observing a
group j worker with a signal θ ∈ {h,l} must form a belief about the probability that the worker is
qualiﬁed. We now analyze the ﬁrm’s belief as follows.
Suppose that at the end of the ﬁrst stage, a proportion πj of the group j population is qualiﬁed.
Then in the second stage, a total measure pπj+(1 − p)
¡
1 − πj¢
of workers receives signal h, among
which a measure pπj is qualiﬁed and a measure (1 − p)
¡
1 − πj¢
is unqualiﬁed. Similarly, a total
measure (1 − p)πj + p
¡
1 − πj¢
of workers receives signal l, among which a measure (1 − p)πj
is qualiﬁed and a measure p
¡
1 − πj¢
is unqualiﬁe d . I nt h et h i r ds t a g e ,e a c hw o r k e ro b s e r v e sh i s
signal. In equilibrium, all group j workers with the same signals must make identical decisions about
whether or not to apply for public sector employment regardless of whether they are qualiﬁed or not
(unless they are indiﬀerent, in which case a decision independent of qualiﬁcations is still optimal).
This absence of selection in job applications follows from the continuation payoﬀ in the fourth stage
being independent of skills. Hence, we conclude that, the proportion of qualiﬁed among group j
workers with signal θ in the fourth stage is unaﬀected by their public sector job application decision
in the third stage, even though the total mass of group j workers with signal θ in the fourth stage
may be diﬀerent from that in the third stage.
Therefore, if the proportion of qualiﬁed workers in group j at the end of the ﬁrst stage is πj,
then in the fourth stage, when a ﬁrm sees a group j worker with a signal θ, its posterior belief that
this worker is qualiﬁed, denoted by Pr
£
s = 1|θ;πj¤
where θ ∈ {h,l}, is given by
Pr
£











exactly as if there were no public sector. Note that in (1), the proportion of investors πj serves
as the prior in the application of Bayes’ rule. Standard arguments show that the “Bertrand”-
type competition between ﬁrms for the workers implies that in the fourth stage, each worker will
be oﬀered a wage equal to his expected productivity in equilibrium (see, e.g., Moro and Norman
2003b). Hence, in the fourth stage, the equilibrium wage for group j workers with signal θ ∈ {h,l}























6Due to the noise in the signal, there are no oﬀ-the-equilibrium histories for the ﬁrms to observe, so beliefs are
fully determined by Bayesian updating. The only place where “perfectness” enters the analysis is that workers in the
private sector choose ﬁrms optimally after any history of play.
7The public sector job application decision in the third stage is now easy to analyze. A group j
worker with signal θ applies to the public sector job if wθ
¡
πj¢







= g, then she is indiﬀerent and the expressions below assume that indiﬀerent workers
apply for the public sector jobs.7 Note that both wh (·)a n dwl (·) in (2) are monotonically increasing
in πj. Deﬁning ˆ πθ as the solution to wθ (ˆ πθ)=g for θ ∈ {h,l}, i.e.,
ˆ πh =
g(1 − p)
g(1 − p)+p(β − g)
, ˆ πl =
gp
gp+( 1 − p)(β − g)
. (3)
We can conclude that a group j worker with signal θ applies for a public sector job if and if πj ≤ ˆ πθ.
A worker’s incentive to acquire skills in the ﬁrst stage comes from the subsequent expected wage
diﬀerential between a qualiﬁe da n da nu n q u a l i ﬁed worker. The wage diﬀerential arises because
qualiﬁed workers are more likely to draw the high signal. Denote the expected wage, before the






respectively where πj is the fraction of qualiﬁed workers in group j and ρj is the
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where the max operator in (4) represents the workers’ optimal decision of whether or not to apply




is equal to the gain in expected wage from skill investment in the ﬁrst stage relative to not invest,


















































































if ˆ πl ≤ π ≤ 1.
(6)
Figure 2 graphically illustrates the function I
¡
πj,ρj¢
for ρj = 0 and ρj = .5.
7For certain values of g it is possible to construct more exotic equilibria by making tie-breaking rules depend on
the investment decision. We ignore such equilibria for two reasons. First of all, the possibility disappears under














Figure 2: An Illustration of the Function I
¡
πj,ρj¢
for ρj =0a n dρj = .5.
The fact that a worker’s incentives for the skill investment is a function of πj, the proportion
of qualiﬁed workers in the population of group j workers, is the source of informational free riding.
The reason that workers will free ride is obvious: the ﬁrms’ perception about the proportion of
qualiﬁed workers in the group j population, which serves as the prior in the Bayesian updating, is a
public good. This informational free riding problem is best illustrated by an extreme case. Suppose
that every worker in the economy invests in skills. Then, regardless what signal the ﬁrms observe,




The incentive to invest depends also on ρj, the probability of public sector employment for
group j workers, which is the reason for a government-mandated preferential (or discriminatory)
policy in the public sector to matter for the private sector labor market in our model. Indeed, a
higher probability of public sector jobs will unambiguously decrease the investment incentives if
























< 0i f ˆ πh ≤ π < ˆ πl
0o t h e r w i s e .
(7)
Assumption 2 made on page 2.3, provided that the public sector is small enough. Secondly, even without Assumption
2, any such “weird” equilibrium will be near an equilibrium where qualiﬁed and unqualiﬁed workers break ties in the
same way if the public sector is small.
9The intuition is simple: the public sector does not give any advantage to qualiﬁed workers over
unqualiﬁed workers.
It is also easy to see that the function I
¡
·,ρj¢








The reason is as follows: if the perception is that no one (respectively, everyone) in group j
is qualiﬁed, then the ﬁrms will oﬀer a wage equal to 0 (respectively, β) to all group j workers
regardless of their signals, implying that there is no advantage to be qualiﬁed.
Using the investment incentives characterized in (6), it is clear that, in the ﬁrst stage, a group
j worker with cost c will invest in skills if and only if c ≤ I
¡
πj,ρj¢
. By the assumption that c










T h er e a s o nt h a tw em a yi g n o r et h ef a c tt h a tI
¡
πj,ρj¢
may possibly be larger than unity is that this
is only relevant at the upper endpoint, where (8) assures that I
¡
1,ρj¢
=0 . For any ρj ∈ [0,1], the
existence of at least one PBNE for group j follows from the mean value theorem. For notational
simplicity, we write Ω
¡
ρj¢
as the set of equilibrium levels of πj∗, namely the set of ﬁxed points of
Eq. (9). It is easy to see that 0 ∈ Ω
¡
ρj¢
for all ρj, that is there is a trivial equilibrium whenever the
investment is costly for all agents. If there exist positive elements in Ω
¡
ρj¢
, we say that there are
non-trivial equilibria for group j under policy parameter ρj; and we will denote the set of non-trivial




Suppose that in the economy, a minority ethnic group, say group A, is subject to government-
mandated discrimination in the sense that ρA = 0; while the majority native group, group B,obtains
public sector jobs with probability ρB > 0. The main result of the paper compares the economic
performances between the two groups, and show that the discriminated group A nevertheless may
be economically more successful than the preferred group B.
A. Equilibrium for Group A and B
We ﬁrst analyze the equilibrium outcomes for the discriminated group A. From (5), group j
workers’ incentive to invest when ρA = 0 can be re-written as









10Simple calculations show that the function I (·,0) is strictly concave in πA, with maximum obtained














Lemma 1 When ρA =0 , the necessary and suﬃcient condition for the existence of a unique





The intuition for Lemma 1 is as follows. To induce the workers to invest in skills, the wage
diﬀerential, which depends on the productivity of a qualiﬁed worker, β, and the precision of the
signal p,h a st ob es u ﬃciently large. The threshold p(1 − p)/(2p − 1)
2 is decreasing in the precision
of the noisy signals p. Indeed when the signal is perfect, when p = 1, any economy with positive β
will admit a non-trivial equilibrium. We will henceforth focus on non-trivial equilibrium whenever
it exists.8
Next, we impose a restriction on the parameters that simpliﬁes the analysis tremendously.
Assumption 1. (2p − 1)2β = 1/2.
This assumption is only for algebraic convenience. As shown in Section 2.3.C, we can relax this
assumption, but the cost of doing so is that our main results can only be demonstrated numerically
rather than analytically. Assumption 1 is satisﬁed, for example, by p =2 /3a n dβ =9 /2. It can be
veriﬁed that assumption 1 insures that the unique non-trivial equilibrium with ρA =0i sg i v e nb y
Ω+ (0) = 1/2. The reason that this simpliﬁes the analysis is that the restriction makes sure that
the equilibrium is at the point where incentives are maximized, i.e., ∂I (1/2,0)/∂πA =0 , which in
turn makes the comparative statics easier to handle.
Now we analyze the equilibrium for the preferred majority group B under assumption 1,a s -
suming that ρB is suﬃciently close to 0. We ﬁrst specify how the public sector wage g compares
with wages in the private sector. To make our results interesting, we will assume that g is higher
than all private sector wages. Recall that all group A workers are hired in the private sector since
ρA =0 . Under assumption 1, πA∗ = 1/2 in the non-trivial equilibrium, thus group A workers with
signal h receive wage pβ and those with signal l receives (1 − p)β. Thus we assume:
Assumption 2. g>p β.
8The trivial equilibrium exists because the lower bound of the support for c is 0. If c c a nt a k eo nn e g a t i v ev a l u e s ,
albeit with arbitrarily small probability, then the trivial equilibrium can be eliminated, justifying the selection.
11Given assumption 2, one can imagine that a government controlled by the political majority
notes that the public sector pays higher wages and is under their control, and mandates a prefer-
ential policy in favor of the politically inﬂuential group.




uniformly below that of group A. Thus, in any non-trivial equilibrium for group B, the proportion
of qualiﬁed workers πB∗ will be less than πA∗ = 1/2. This statement holds without assumptions 1-2.
Now we establish the necessary and suﬃcient condition for the existence of non-trivial equilibrium
for group B when ρB > 0:
Lemma 2 Under Assumptions 1-2, if ρB > 0, then there exists a unique non-trivial equilibrium if
and only if ρB < 1 − 2p(1 − p).
The intuition for Lemma 2 is straightforward. Recall that I
¡
·,ρB¢
shifts downward as ρB
increases. Thus if ρB is too high, the slope of I
¡
·,ρB¢




will intersect with the 45 degree line only at the origin, resulting at a trivial
equilibrium only.
B. Economic Performance Comparison For Small ρB
Now we compare the economic performance for the discriminated minority group A and pre-
ferred majority group B when ρB is positive but suﬃciently close to zero.
When ρB is suﬃciently small, we know from Lemma 2 that there is a unique non-trivial equi-
librium Ω+ ¡
ρB¢












where the second equality follows from (6) since we know from our earlier discussion that Ω+ ¡
ρB¢
≤
Ω+ (0) = 1/2, and assumption 2 implies that ˆ πh > 1/2. That is, in the range of possible equilibrium
proportions of qualiﬁed group B workers, g is high enough so that everyone applies for public sector
employment, implying that the incentive to invest is the same as the incentive to invest without




















Under assumption 1, Ω+ (0) = 1/2 and since ∂I (1/2,0)/∂πB =0( T h i si st h em a i na l g e b r a i c










12For any ρB within a small neighborhood of 0, the expected wage in the unique non-trivial group B





















































with respect to ρB and eval-







¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
ρB=0
=












Indirect Eﬀect z }| {
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dπB =4 p(1 − p)β,







¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
ρB=0
=
Direct Eﬀects z }| { n
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Indirect Eﬀect z }| {
−2p(1 − p)β = g − β. (16)







¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
ρB=0
= g − 4p(1 − p)β. (17)
Since 4p(1 − p) < 1, we have proved the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Under assumptions 1- 2 ,i fm o r e o v e rg<4p(1−p)β, then the expected wage of both
qualiﬁed and unqualiﬁed group A workers are higher than those of respective group B workers if
ρA =0and ρB > 0 is suﬃciently small.





. When the government
marginally increases ρB from 0, there are two direct eﬀects: ﬁrst, the group will now have a higher
degree of access to a higher paying public sector, captured by the term g in (16); second, they will
less likely enter the private sector, resulting in a loss captured by the term −
h




(16). The direct eﬀects are positive since
g −
h
p2 +( 1 − p)
2
i
β = g − [p +( 1 − p)(1 − 2p)]β >g− pβ > 0,
13where the last inequality follows from assumption 2. However, the negative indirect eﬀect resulting
from the feedback of the increase in ρB on the equilibrium skill investment behavior of group B
workers in the private sector, captured by the term −2p(1 − p)β in (16), more than oﬀsets the





can also decrease in
ρB.
To satisfy the condition pβ <g<4p(1 − p)β in Proposition 1, the precision of the test signal
p h a st ob el e s st h a n3 /4. That the precision in the signal cannot be too high for the equilibrium
eﬀects to dominate should be intuitive: A beneﬁcial net eﬀect from being excluded from the public
sector can only occur if the informational free riding problem in the private sector is severe enough;
and the higher p, the less severe this problem is.
Proposition 1 i sac o m p a r i s o no fe x p e c t e dw a g e s ,f o rb o t hq u a l i ﬁed and unqualiﬁed, between
the discriminated minority group A with ρA = 0 and the preferred majority group B with ρB > 0.
However, for Pareto comparisons we must take into consideration that when ρB is positive, some
group B workers with cost ˜ c choose not to invest in skills, while counterpart group A workers with
the same cost ˜ c would invest since Ω+ ¡
ρB¢
< Ω+ (0). That is, to compare full welfare, we have to
take into account skill investment costs. However, recall that those group A workers who invest had
the option not to invest when ρA =0 , so by their revealed preference, their expected welfare (net
of skill investment cost) must be higher than the expected wage of group A unqualiﬁed workers.
The latter, however, is higher than that of group B unqualiﬁed workers by Proposition 1.T h u sw e
have:
Proposition 2 Under assumptions 1-2, if moreover g<4p(1 − p)β, then group B workers of all
skill investment cost types are economically worse oﬀ than their group A counterparts if ρA =0
and ρB > 0 is small.
C. More General Economic Performance Comparison
In this section, we argue that Proposition 1 and 2 are valid without assumptions 1-2. First,
for group A where ρA =0 , we can ﬁnd the unique non-trivial equilibrium, if it exists, directly by
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Note that Ω+ (0) given by the expression (18) is always less than 1, but to guarantee that it is
p o s i t i v e ,i tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a tβ >p(1 − p)/(2p − 1)
2 , conﬁrming Lemma 1.















Figure 3: Expected wage of qualiﬁed (Panel A) and unqualiﬁed (Panel B) group B workers as a
function of ρB : β =3 ,p=0 .73,g=2 .5.
For group B where ρB > 0, in general the incentive function I
¡
·,ρB¢
g i v e nb y( 6 )m a yn o tb e
globally concave in πB, but we know that for ρB > 0, any non-trivial equilibrium must be smaller
than Ω+ (0). If we further assume that Ω+ (0) < ˆ πh where Ω+ (0) and ˆ πh are respectively given
by (18) and (3), then arguments analogous to those in the proof of Lemma 2 can show that there
exists a unique non-trivial equilibrium if and only if ρ < 1 − p(1 − p)/(2p − 1)
2 β. We summarize
the above discussion as:
Lemma 3 For any ρB > 0, if Ω+ (0) < ˆ πh holds where Ω+ (0) and ˆ πh are respectively given
by (18) and (3), then there exists a unique non-trivial equilibrium for group B if and only if
ρB < 1 − p(1 − p)/(2p − 1)
2 β.
The condition Ω+ (0) < ˆ πh plays the role of assumption 2 in Section 2.3.A (in fact, if Ω+ (0) =
1/2, the assumption Ω+ (0) < ˆ πh reduces to the condition g>p β). In general, it requires that
g>
Ω+ (0)pβ
[1 − Ω+ (0)](1 − p)+Ω+ (0)p
.
Though the above inequality looks rather complicated, once one takes into account that Ω+ (0) is
given by (18), it involves only the primitives of the economy.
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15Again it can be readily veriﬁed that if we plug in ρB = 0 in the expression Ω+ ¡
ρB¢
above, we
immediately get the expression Ω+ (0) in (18). Since (19) fully characterizes the unique equilibrium
for any ρB > 0 for economies satisfying the condition Ω+ (0) < ˆ πh, w ec a ni np r i n c i p l ep r o c e e da s
in Section 2.3.B at this point.
Not surprisingly, it is impractical to try to get analytical results from (19), but the following
numerical example demonstrates that the main result of Section 2.3.B is robust. Set β =3 ,p=0 .73,
and g =2 .5. When ρA =0 , we can numerically calculate that in the unique non-trivial equilibrium
Ω+ (0) = 0.61 and the private sector wage for workers with high signal wh (Ω+ (0)) = 2.43, and
wl (Ω+ (0)) = 1.1, and ˆ πh =0 .65.
It can be easily veriﬁed that all the conditions in Lemma 3 are satisﬁed. Hence we use the
formula given by (19) to calculate the non-trivial equilibrium when ρB is positive. We then plot
the expected wages of qualiﬁed and unqualiﬁed workers in the non-trivial equilibrium associated
with diﬀerent levels of ρB a c c o r d i n gt o( 15). Figure 3 demonstrates that indeed, the expected wage
for qualiﬁed and unqualiﬁed workers are both declining as ρB increase provided that ρB is not
too large. By continuity, there is an open set of economies in which small positive probability of
public sector employment makes all group B workers economically worse oﬀ than their group A
counterparts.
D. Summary
In this section, we presented and solved a simple model to illustrate the idea that giving a
group preferential access to high paying public sector jobs may dampen the incentives for skill
investment valuable in the private sector. If the informational free riding problem in the private
labor is suﬃciently severe, it is possible that the adverse indirect eﬀect due to the exacerbated
informational free riding may dominate the favorable direct eﬀects.
Throughout the section we have assumed, for simplicity, that the skill investment costs in the
population follows a Uniform [0,1] distribution. If instead, the cost distribution is given by a general
continuous CDF J (·), then the equilibrium condition for an arbitrary policy parameter ρ ∈ (0,1)
will become π = J (I (π,ρ)). Qualitatively, the analysis of the more general case is very similar.
First, we notice that Ω+ (0) is a non-trivial equilibrium given distribution J for any J satisfying
J (I (Ω+ (0),0)) = I (Ω+ (0),0). If J is weakly concave, Ω+ (0) continues to be the unique non-
trivial equilibrium. For the local analysis, all that matters is the density of costs evaluated at
c = Ω+ (0). Hence, if we restrict attention to symmetric distributions with support on [0,1]i t
follows that for any distribution with density J0 ¡1
2
¢
> 1 the indirect eﬀect will be larger than in
the uniform case, whereas the eﬀect will be smaller if J0 ¡1
2
¢
< 1. This should make it clear that
16our results are not an artefact of the uniform distribution.
Our analysis also sheds light on the determinant of the relationship between a group’s economic
performance and whether it is discriminated against by government-mandate that we mentioned in
the introduction. In our simple model, it is ρj :i fρA =0 , then for group A to be economically more
successful than group B,ρB > 0 can not be too high; if ρB is suﬃciently high, group B would beneﬁt
from preferential treatment by the government. Using the interpret of ρj as the degree of coverage
of the government-mandated discriminatory policies, we provide a unifying theme to understand
the divergent economic performances of the Blacks, Chinese and Jews in their respective “hostile”
environments. In Southeast Asian countries, for example, the native majority gave themselves
preferential treatment in the public sector and elite professions after their independence in the
NEP (see Sowell 1990). However, there are natural capacity constraints for such positions, so
that not every applicant can be given a job (more evidence below). Blacks in the U.S. under Jim
Crow and in South Africa under apartheid, however, are excluded from a much broader range of
professions.9
Up to now we have shown that giving a group preferential access to the public sector jobs
may make them economically worse oﬀ since its negative incentive eﬀects on skill investment may
dominate the positive direct eﬀect due to the higher wages from the public sector jobs. While
we have shown the results qualitatively, we emphasize that the magnitude of the eﬀect could be
substantial as well depending on the support and shape of the investment cost distribution.10
3 Evidence
So far we presented a simple theoretical model to relate the group disparity in economic per-
formance to government-mandated discriminatory policies. As true in almost all inquiries in social
science, there are alternative explanations that could be consistent with an existing set of empir-
ical regularities. In this section, we present empirical facts from a dramatic social policy change
in Malaysia in 1970 to provide evidence in support of our theory relative to other explanations.
Similar discriminatory policies have been implemented in many other southeast Asian countries,
but the size of the Chinese minority in Malaysia (about one-third of the population) makes it an
ideal example.
9Another crucial diﬀerence is that the Blacks in pre-civil rights America or South Africa under Apertheid probably
were excluded from sectors where skill investment were important, whereas our assumption that the government
excludes the minority from sectors where skills are less important seems more realistic in the case of the overseas
Chinese in Asia.
10The details are available from the authors upon request.
17A. Political Background
Malaysia gained independence from British colonial rule in 1957 and became a Muslim country,
which under its constitution allowed preferential treatment of ethnic Malays over other races.
An interesting feature of Malaysian society is that its population is characterized by a diverse
ethnic composition resulting from large population movements in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. In 1988, about 58% of the population of Peninsular Malaysia were Malays (the bumiputras
or “sons of the soil”), 32% were Chinese, 10% Indians, while Thais, Eurasians, and others made up
less than 1% (Schafgans 1998).
One of the main issues of contention in the pre-independence Malaya was the proposed con-
stitutional plan regarding the relative status of Malays to non-Malays. In 1957 an agreement was
reached that the Constitution would protect the Malays by entitling them to certain privileges
including political power, while at the same time allowing the Chinese to pursue their economic
objectives without interference. The three main ethnic political parties formed a coalition known
as the Alliance which ﬁrmly supported the above formula for racial harmony in post-independence
Malaya, and the Alliance won the general elections of 1955, 1959 and 1964.
However, the Malay nationalist and religious sentiment grew over time while the Chinese com-
munity sought greater political representation, social reforms and racial integration. Alternative
ideological platforms were oﬀered: the nationalistic Pan Malayan Islamic Party, and the Chinese
working-class supported Democratic Action Party. In 1969 general election the Alliance lost ground
to these alternative parties, and with it the Alliance’s formula for racial harmony was rejected. Fol-
lowing the election, racial riots ensued, the federal parliament and state assembly were suspended
and state emergency was declared (see Chapter 2 of Gomez and Jomo 1999).
It was against such political backdrop that the New Economic Policy (henceforth NEP) was
announced in 1970. The primary objectives of the NEP were to “eradicate poverty”, irrespective of
race and to achieve inter-ethnic economic parity between the pre-dominantly Malay Bumiputeras
and the pre-dominantly Chinese non-Bumiputeras by “restructuring society” (see Chapter 3 of
Gomez and Jomo 1999 for detailed accounts and Yip 2000 for a summary). To achieve the second
objective, wide-ranging preferential policies favouring the Malays were introduced. The major
components of these preferential policies include the following: licences to participate in certain
economic sectors and subsidies in agriculture are handed out on a racial basis; Malays have easier
access to public sector employment; racial quotas are enforced in university admissions; a mandatory
minimum of 30% ethnic Malay equity ownership is required in certain types of ﬁrms. Under the
NEP, the total number of enterprises owned by federal and state authorities grew considerably (see
Table 1). Because of the ostensible pro-Malay bias, the proportion of non-Malay employment in
18Industry 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1992
Agriculture 4 5 103 88 3127 146
Building & Construction 2 9 9 33 65 1211 21
Extractive Industries 0 1 3 6 25 30 32
Finance 3 9 175 07 8116 137
Manufacturing 5 11 40 132 212 289 315
Services 3 6 137 6148 258 321
Transport 5 13 172 74 56 3 6 8
O t h e r s 000006 9
Total 22 54 109 362 656 1,010 1,149
Source: Gomez and Jomo (1999)
Table 1: Number of public enterprises in Malaysia, 1960-92.
the public sector declined dramatically under the NEP as the number of federal and state-owned
enterprises grew.
B. Data
We use the Second Malaysian Family Life Survey (MFLS-2), in particular, survey instrument
MF23 administered to men, to analyze the change of wage inequality between the Chinese and the
Malays after the implementation of the NEP.11 MFLS-2 was collected between August 1988 and
January 1989. It was the sequel to the First Malaysian Family Life Survey (MFLS-1) conducted in
1970, and the geographic coverage of both surveys was restricted to Peninsular Malaysia. It records
t h eo c c u p a t i o nc a t e g o r yo fe a c hj o be v e rh e l db yam a l e ,t h ed a t et h ej o bs t a r t e da n de n d e d ,a sw e l l
as the starting and ending wage of each job, and the highest education level completed. The data
used below is drawn from the “panel”, “child” and “new” samples of the survey. The combined
sample contains 4789 men, and restricting attention to those between 18a n d6 5l e a v e su sw i t h
approximately 3460 observations. The retrospective employment data is used to construct the
total experience of each person. Since only the starting and ending (or 1988) wages of each job
held by an individual are observed, we could in principle impute the wage at speciﬁcy e a r si nt h e
employment history by linear interpolation. However, examining the earnings data reveals that the
mean increase in earnings is 10.5% per year for the Malays and 21.2% per year for the Chinese. In
11The data set was collected by RAND and the National Population and Family Development Board of Malaysia.
It is publicly available at http://www.rand.org/FLS/.
19what follows, we will use either the current wage or the most recent starting wage for the years in
a speciﬁc year during an employment spell.12
C. Empirical Facts
Proportion of Public Sector Employment by Chinese and Malays. We ﬁrst provide
some crude estimate of the probability of obtaining public sector employment in Malaysia. In
MFLS-2, the only occupational category that can be unambiguously identiﬁed as public sector
employment is category code 31 “Government Oﬃcials.” The data code book does not explicitly
state what this category exactly includes; but given the other detailed occupation categories (a
total of 98 occupation categories) in the data, almost surely this is only a small subset of proper
public sector employment. Using this downward-biased measure, we ﬁnd that, including all birth
cohorts and all levels of experience, 0.45% of the Malay men, and literally none of the Chinese men,
reported working in the occupation of “Government Oﬃcials.” Figure 4 shows the percentage of
Malay men reportedly employed as “Government Oﬃcials” in 1988 by birth cohorts. Since birth
cohorts prior to 1935 started retiring in 1988, we will restrict our attention to the birth cohorts
later than 1935. While some changes of the percentages in the ﬁgure certainly reﬂe c ti np a r tt h e
life-cycle nature of public sector employment, it does appear that cohorts from 1946 on are more
likely employed as “Government Oﬃcials.” Together with our earlier accounts from Gomez and
Jomo (1999) that the public enterprises dramatically increased after 1970, we are conﬁdent that
the probability of public sector employment has indeed increased substantially from 1970 for the
Malays, but not for the Chinese.
Wage Ratio Between The Chinese and Malays. In MFLS-2, the average income of
Chinese men, including all birth cohorts and all levels of experience, is about 1.92 times that of
Malays. This is slightly less than the average household income ratio of 2.2 between the Chinese
and the Malays found in Anand (1983) using the data from 1970 Post-Enumeration Survey, which
is indicative of a reduction in ethnic inequality. However, when we look at the ratio of the average
wage between the Chinese and the Malays by birth cohort, a diﬀerent picture emerges. If the
NEP is indeed successful in reducing racial earnings inequality, we should see that at all levels of
schooling and experience, the earnings gap should decline. Moreover, the decline should be more
pronounced for cohorts that entered the work force in 1970 and after (birth cohorts from 1950 on),
because the Malays in these younger cohorts experience both increased employment and education
12This would lead to a downward bias in the estimate of the wage ratio between the Chinese and the Malays, but
qualitative results regarding the change of the wage ratio are robust to diﬀerent methods to interpolate the wages
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Figure 4: Percentage of Malays in occupation “Government Oﬃcials” in their current job in 1988.
opportunities because of the NEP. Figure 5 shows the ratio of the average Chinese and the Malays
wages by birth cohorts and experience level. We mark the birth cohort 1950 in Figure 5 to indicate
that it is the ﬁrst cohort fully impacted by the NEP in both education and employment. While
Figure 5 does not control for the diﬀerences in the years of schooling, controlling for schooling
(based on a Mincer wage regression) does not change the qualitative feature of the movement of
Chinese/Malay wage ratios. The only eﬀect is that all curves are scaled downwards. A very similar
curve arises if we do not include men who reported working as “Government Oﬃcials.”13
A few features are worth commenting on. First, except for the entrants into the labor force, the
Chinese-Malay wage ratios were steadily above one at other experience levels. Second, there has
been a secular narrowing of the wage gap prior to the NEP at all three experience levels, suggesting
a decline in the income inequality between the Chinese and the Malays in the pre-1970 era. This
is consistent with Gomez and Jomo (1999)’s ﬁnding that, between 1957 and 1970, the inter-ethnic
income diﬀerences were reduced slightly. Third, and the most surprising, is that the wage gap
increased at all three experience levels after 1970. In fact, young Malays enjoyed a slight advantage
upon entry into the labor force for cohorts born in the 1940s and early 1950s.14 However, this
slight advantage disappeared after the NEP. It seems to be a puzzle that, despite the aggressive
13We followed Yip (2000)’s econometric procedure in calculating the wage ratios.
14This is consistent with Schafgan (1998)’s ﬁnding, applying semi-parametric methods to the whole sample, that
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Figure 5: Ratio of mean Chinese and Malay wages by birth cohorts.
preferential policies favoring the Malays, the Malay did not achieve signiﬁcant economic progress
relative to the Chinese; if anything, the opposite seems to be true, that is, the NEP reversed the
pre-1970 trend of the narrowing wage gaps between the Chinese and the Malays.
D. Evaluating Alternative Explanations
Our simple model could explain the seemingly puzzling relationship between the Chinese/Malay
wage gap and the degree of preferential treatment of the Malays. Our explanation is that the NEP
itself provides adverse incentives to invest in unobservable skills. Now we evaluate alternative
explanations.
The ﬁrst obvious alternative explanation is that immigrants are a selective sample of individuals.
Using U.S. data, Borjas (1987, 1994) found that immigrant earnings “overtake” that of native
workers within ﬁfteen years after controlling for socioeconomic characteristics. Since there seems
to be no particular reason for immigrants to accumulate more human capital than native workers,
this evidence suggests that immigrants are more “able” and “diligent”. While it is certainly possible
that immigrants in the U.S. are more likely to have these productive traits, it does not seem to
be the case for Chinese immigrants to Malaysia. We don’t have any hard evidence in this regard,
but narratives of the Chinese migration to the Malay Peninsula claim that the vast majority of
22the immigrants were sojourners doing manual labor in the mines and on plantations. For example,
Sowell (1990, P. 46) states that the Chinese immigrants, when ﬁrst arriving at Malaysia, were
“initially largely illiterate as well as destitute,” while the education for Malays were provided for
free by the colonial government.15
The selection argument also seems implausible in this particular case for the simple reason that
the Chinese have been in Malaysia for so long. Almost 30 percent of the population was ethnically
Chinese already by 1921 (See Purcell, 1965, P. 224). The majority of the Chinese population are
thus second generation immigrants and beyond, so it seems that any genetic diﬀerences between
the ﬁrst generation Chinese immigrants and the native Malays should have been depressed by mean
reversion.
Another possible explanation for the wage gap is that cultural factors unrelated to the local
economy make the Chinese minority economically more successful than the majority. Studies of
U.S. immigrant earnings seem to suggest that cultural diﬀerences are important, and there is no a
priori reason why Malaysia should be any diﬀerent.16 We do indeed think that it is very plausible
that the wage gap has something to do with cultural diﬀerences. However, although a theory based
on cultural diﬀerences may “explain” the diﬀerences in income levels between the Chinese and the
Malays, it would be silent on why the ethnic wage gap in Malaysia is inversely related to the degree
of preferential treatment of the Malays under the NEP, unless one assumes that the NEP coincided
with a sudden change in either the Chinese or the Malay cultures.17
Moreover, while it is convenient to attribute the success of overseas Chinese and Jews to their
unique culture, our view is that this explanation is at best incomplete. Culture is not exogenous, it
evolves, presumably at least partially in response to changes in the economic environment. Unless
15See Purcell (1965, pages 276-281) for details on diﬀerences in the availability of schooling during the ﬁrst half of
the twentieth century. Interestingly, free education was also given to the children of Tamil laborers, whereas Chinese
schools initially received no support.
16The view that cultural diﬀerences are important is often supported by appeal to the large persistence in relative
performance between diﬀerent ethnic groups among second and third generation immigrants (see Borjas 1992, 1994).
Combined with the perception (supported by, e.g., Becker and Tomes 1986) that there is a rather small correlation
between acquired skills of parents and children, this suggests that groups somehow diﬀer. Borjas (1992) attributes
this to cultural diﬀerences modeled by introducing “ethnic capital” as an input in human capital formation. More
directly related to the ethnic Chinese, Landa (1999) proposes a theory of Chinese merchant success, based on the
premise that the Confucian code of ethics facilitate cooperation.
17We also note that the same Confucian heritage that is sometimes considered beneﬁcial for oversaes Chinese was
blamed for the backwardness of China in the 1950s (see, e.g., Needham 1956). Moreover (see Juan 1996, Page 15),
the ethnic Chinese economy achieved rapid growth during the 1970s in the Philippines and other Southeast Asian
countries, at the same time as the propagation of Chinese language and culture started on its swift trend downwards.
23cultural diﬀerences are explained as an equilibrium phenomenon, there is a danger that “culture”
becomes a catch-all explanation of seemingly puzzling economic disparities.
At a more general level, however, we do not consider our model and endogenous social norms
as competing explanations. Instead, we can, with some stretching, also consider our paper as
simplistic model of endogenous culture speciﬁcally designed to understand the success of minority
groups in “hostile” environments. That is, discrimination leads to a culture favoring investments in
skills useful for private sector enterprises. As in Cole et al. (1992), externalities are crucial, but the
externalities are generated from diﬀerent sources. In Cole et al. (1992), the externality results from
non-market interactions (matching with marriage partners being their leading example), while in
our paper, it is the informational externality that arises in the ﬁrms’ inference about the workers’
skill.
4 Conclusion
Some minorities, notably overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia and Jews in Europe, have per-
formed economically better than the native majorities, despite being subject to government-mandated
discriminatory policies. We provide a simple explanation based on the incentive eﬀects generated
by preferential policies. We also present evidence from the evolution of Chinese/Malay wage ratio
after the implementation of NEP that is consistent with our model but hard to reconcile with the
most commonly invoked explanations based on immigration selection and cultural diﬀerences.
The model also has other testable implications. First, following the adoption of a more pref-
erential policies to the majority group, our model predicts that the income inequality among the
preferred group will increase. This implication is supported by the evidence in Malaysia. Sowell
(1990, P. 48), citing the study by Puthucheary (1983), stated that: “Income inequality among
Malays increased under preferential policies, with the income share of the top 10 percent rising
from 42 percent to 53 percent of all income received by Malays.” This pattern, as Sowell stated,
w a s“ b yn om e a n sc o n ﬁned to Malaysia.”
Second, our model provides an alternative explanation to the experience of overseas Japanese
on the mainland U.S. and Hawaii. As Sowell (1996, P. 119) states: “Ironically, the Japanese on
the mainland, who historically faced more discrimination, as well as wartime internment, achieved
higher incomes and occupational levels than those in Hawaii. The Japanese in Hawaii were also
much more active politically, and by 1971 had a majority in the state legislature.” Sowell explains
this phenomenon through immigration selection: “Historically, the Japanese who immigrated to
Hawaii came from poorer regions and poorer classes in Japan than did those who went to the U.S.
24mainland,” but he failed to explain why such a pattern of immigration selection emerged. This
phenomenon, however, can be naturally explained by our model.
The economic forces emphasized in our model can be applied in other settings. For example,
more generous welfare beneﬁts may decrease the incentives of skill investment, which in turn will
indirectly lower single mothers’ labor market opportunities due to a more pessimistic view of single
mothers’ skills by employers. Under some conditions, higher welfare beneﬁtm a yi n d u c es u c ha
negative indirect labor market response that overshadows the positive beneﬁt from the higher
welfare beneﬁt itself, and make single mothers ex ante worse oﬀ.18
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27A Appendix: Proofs
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 : Simple algebra can show that I (·,0) is strictly concave in πA, hence
I (·,0) crosses the 45
◦
line at most twice. Since 0 is already a ﬁxed point, there is at most one






which is equivalent to the condition stated.
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 : Under assumption 2, ˆ πh as deﬁned in (3) is larger than 1/2. Hence for





















Since any non-trivial group B equilibria must lie in the interval (0,1/2] when ρB > 0. Uniqueness
follows from the strict concavity of I
¡
·,ρB¢
in the interval (0,1/2]. Non-trivial equilibrium exists
if and only ∂I
¡
0,ρB¢












where the last equality follows from assumption 1. Hence ∂I
¡
0,ρB¢
/∂πB > 1 if and only if
ρB < 1 − 2p(1 − p).
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